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potential.  Traditional  exports  were  seen  as  offering  rents  that  could  be 
distributed  to  other  parts  of  the  economy.  Nontraditional  exports  were 
hindered severely by  an  inadequate exchange rate policy and by  a range of 
fiscal incentives which really did not have much effect on the margin in the 
incentives to produce nontraditional exportables,  Public investments in the 
tradable  sector, as  discussed in  the  previous chapter,  generally were  un- 
profitable and socially costly. They were motivated more by  political con- 
siderations and  easy  foreign  credit,  rather  than  by  a  careful  cost-benefit 
analysis. Finally, unwarranted policy hopes were held for export promotion 
within the context of regional integration schemes, particularly the Andean 
Pact. These regional schemes proved to be superfluous for Bolivia, not only 
because the target  market remained very  small even after integration, but 
also because the Andean countries almost all descended into deep crisis in 
the 1980s. 
5  Aspects of Foreign Debt 
Accumulation, 1952-85 
As was shown in table  1.8, Bolivia has depended significantly on foreign 
savings to finance gross capital formation since the late 1950s. The bulk of 
that  foreign  financing  has  come  in  the  form  of  medium-  and  long-term 
(MLT) loans to the public sector, which is the category of capital inflow that 
we  will examine in  this chapter.  Unfortunately, it  is difficult to study the 
foreign debt of  the Bolivian private  sector because of  a lack  of  adequate 
data, though available information suggests that the debt of the public sector 
is indeed by  far the dominant form of  external indebtedness.'  It should be 
mentioned, however, that private nonguaranteed debt increased very rapidly 
in  the crucial  subperiod  1978-82,  just  preceding  the  extreme macroeco- 
nomic crisis.  The measured short-term debt remained fairly constant over 
time,  but  the  quality  of  the  data  on  this  type  of  debt  prevents  us  from 
drawing any firm conclusions. The frequent shifts in the classification of the 
debt because of reschedulings, arrears, and the assumption of the debt of one 
sector by another during the past several years makes the analysis even more 
difficult. 
An  historical view of Bolivia's borrowing can help to discriminate among 
the different factors responsible for the debt crisis.  Bolivia had  access to 
loans from official multilateral sources and from governments since the final 
years of the  1950s. These credits had  a concessional element,  the  size of 
which  decreased significantly over  time.  Already  by  the  first half  of  the 215  BolividChapter 5 
1960s, Bolivia had a debt-GNP ratio in excess of 30 percent and by  1970, a 
debt-GNP ratio of over 40 percent, as we see in table 5.1. The innovation in 
the  1970s was Bolivia’s renewed access to financial markets from which it 
had been cut off after defaulting on its public sector bond debt in 193  1. This 
led to a marked shift in the structure of  the debt, as is shown in table 5.2, 
from official sources to private sources, particularly to banks. The share of 
bank debt soared from 2.3 percent of the total to 38.9 percent in  1981. 
The  first  incursion of  the commercial banks  into lending to  Bolivia in 
recent history occurred in  1972 when the government received credits from 
Citibank,  Swiss Bank  Corporation,  and the Bank of  America to  compen- 
sate foreign  owners  of  those  firms  nationalized by  President Torres  (see 
Ugarteche  1986, 150, and the references therein). Other credits with very 
expensive borrowing  terms followed. There was  also a  significant rise in 
suppliers’ credits. 
In 1977 Bolivia was still in good standing with the international banks, but 
the  spillover effects of  problems elsewhere  in  the  developing world  had 
negative repercussions on borrowing terms, resulting in shorter-term loans 
and higher-risk premiums. By  1980 Bolivia faced a severe debt problem that 
had not yet been resolved by  the end of  the  1980s. The problems with the 
commercial banks are the gravest, but are not the only critical aspect of the 
debt crisis. In the early 1980s, the military regimes in Argentina and Brazil 
gave short-term financing to the generals in Bolivia. In 1983 this short-term 
debt was refinanced into a longer maturity,  thereby  sharply increasing the 
MLT public debt. This explains why, while net capital flows were negative 
in 1983, there was a sharp increase in measured MLT debt. 
If  one looks at  the conventional measures of  overall indebtedness (see 
table 5.1),  MLT public debt relative to GDP was already high in the 1960s. 
Indeed, the ratio of MLT public debt to exports in the 1960s and early 1970s 
was actually above the  average ratio between  1974 and  1977. But,  as we 
should like to  stress,  this observation neglects the  fact that  the nature of 
Table 5.1  Debt Indicators, 1970-87  (public and publicly guaranteed debt) 
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Table 5.2  Structure of Medium- and Long-Term Debt, 1970-85  (proportion of total 
debt outstanding and disbursed) 











































Source:  World Bank Debt Tables, 1988- 89 edition. 
”This  category  is  “private  financial  markets,”  and  includes  a  small  amount  of  bond  debt  not  held  by 
commercial hanks. 
Bolivia’s debt had changed decisively, with a sharp increase in the share of 
debt owed to foreign commercial banks, a point that can be seen clearly in 
table 5.2. 
In part because of this change, the indicators of debt servicing (as opposed 
to indicators based  on the stock of  debt) suffered a persistent  deterioration 
over time, as can be observed in table 5.3. It should be noted that the figures 
on interest service understate  the contractual  debt burden because  they are 
based on actual payments and not on payments due, and since the portion of 
interest in  arrears is very important, especially  in the  1982-85  subperiod. 
The  increasing  debt-service  ratios  reflect  the  change  in  the  nature  of 
indebtedness  and,  more  precisely,  the  shift  from  debt  with  a  large  con- 
cessional  element  toward  debt  on  market  terms,  in  a  situation  in  which 
market interest rates were rising sharply. The debt-service indicators relative 
to  export  of  goods  and  services  worsened  progressively  in  the  1970s, 
compared to the values at the very beginning of  the decade. 
In sum, Bolivia’s creditworthiness  improved  very significantly in the first 
half of the 1970s, if creditworthiness  is defined as access to market lending. 
The extraordinary upsurge  of  exports (and its effects  on real  GDP) in  the 
1970s created an illusion in regard to the long-run economic prospects of  a 
country that had been, before this event, very dependent on foreign aid and 
loans with highly  concessional  terms. By  1980, however,  that illusion had 
been  shattered.  Bolivia’s  creditworthiness  disappeared  once  again,  and 
Bolivia found itself in a debt-rescheduling exercise with the banks, two years 
before the outbreak of the global debt crisis. 
5.1  The Nature of  Borrowing by the Public Sector in the 1970s 
The big push for debt accumulation appeared between  1975 and  1980, as 
can be seen in table 5.4.  Who were the beneficiaries of the growing external 217  BolividChapter 5 
Table 5.3  Debt-Service Indicators, 1970-87  (public and publicly guaranteed debt) 































Source:  World Bank Debt Tables, 1988-89  edition. 
Note:  The data refer to total debt servicing on medium- and long-term public and publicly guaranteed debt. 
Table 5.4  Debt Outstanding and Disbursed, Medium and Long Term, 1970-85 
(in millions of  U.S. dollars) 
1970  480 
1975  824 
1980  2,228 
1981  2,765 
1982  2,861 
1983  3,279 
1984  3,386 
1985  3,484 
Source:  World Bank Debt Tables,  1988-89  edition 
debt?  Among  the  public  enterprises,  the  state  oil  company,  YPFB,  was 
probably  the  major  recipient,  followed  by  the  smelting company,  CMK 
(Complejo Minero Karachipampa), and the state mining company, COMI- 
BOL.  Loans contracted by  the  specialized state banks,  with  public sector 
guarantees, were channelled to the private sector producers. The stock of 
debt owed by  the central government also grew very rapidly between 1975 
and  1979. The big increase between  1979 and  1981 was caused essentially 
by a transfer of a debt from COMIBOL (and other less important enterprises) 
to the TGN. 
The  important  question,  of  course,  is  why  the  Bolivian  government 
increased  its  indebtedness  so  rapidly  at  the  end  of  the  1970s.  As  was 
discussed in earlier chapters,  the  data  suggest that  most  of  the debt was 
related to the rapid growth of public investment projects, which in turn were 
linked to a complex of  political and economic factors. We  have identified 
several of  those factors at length in earlier chapters, including (1) the very 
short time horizon of  Bolivian governments; (2) the use of  state enterprises 
as a vehicle for political control; (3) the use of  state enterprises as a conduit 
for channelling public money to favored parts of  the private sectors; (4) the 
soft budget constraint of the state enterprises, which reduced the incentives 218  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
to monitor investment projects; (5) the overvaluation of  the exchange rate, 
which  led  to  a  misallocation  of  investment spending into highly  capital- 
intensive projects  and  which  increased  the  budget  deficits  of  the  public 
enterprises; (6) the  use of  state enterprises as  buffers for macroeconomic 
shocks; and so forth. And as we have seen, the mega-investment projects of 
the public sector in the end failed to pay the necessary returns. 
In  addition, there was certainly a misjudgment about the country’s true 
macroeconomic situation, as well as a failure to predict (along with the rest 
of  the world!)  the sharp swings that were to take place in the international 
economy  at  the  end  of  the  1970s and  the  early  1980s. One  part  of  the 
misjudgment came from the fact that Bolivia’s strong economic performance 
in  the  1970s  reflected  a  temporary  terms-of-trade  improvement  and  the 
effects  of  the  foreign  loans  themselves,  rather  than  a  true  underlying 
improvement in the economy. The annual average terms of trade of  1976-80 
was 22 percent higher than the average in  1971-75.  This meant a positive 
real income effect of  terms-of-trade change of  6.2 percent of  GDP for the 
second  half  relative to  the  first one.  This  improvement  turned  out  to  be 
temporary,  though  the borrowing behavior  implicitly assumed  that  it  was 
permanent. 
With respect to the international environment, the low real interest rates 
on international loans were perceived to be permanent, when of course they 
turned out to be temporary. As  stressed by  Morales and Sachs (1989), this 
change in  the interest rate  environment helps  to  account for the fact that 
overborrowing (and overlending by the banks) was a common feature of the 
entire world at the end of  the 1970s. 
5.2  Private Nonguaranteed Debt 
In 1985 the private nonguaranteed debt was 8 percent of  the total external 
debt ($314 million, or approximately 8 percent of  GDP). While the amount 
is modest, it grew very  rapidly in the late  1970s and early 1980s. Several 
channels were used  by  the private sector to  contract nonguaranteed debt. 
Credits were  given directly by  the  international commercial banks  to  the 
debtors,  or they  were  intermediated by  their  local  subsidiaries or  by  the 
domestic banks. A significant fraction of the nonguaranteed debt is actually 
suppliers’ credit  from  foreign manufacturers to  their  authorized domestic 
agents in Bolivia. 
The participation of the domestic banks in the marketing of foreign credits 
increased, somewhat surprisingly, when a hardening in the borrowing terms 
occurred  and  the international banks and  their subsidiaries were  reducing 
their direct exposure. The implicit assumption on the part of  the Bolivian 
banks may have been that there were de facto public sector guarantees on the 
private sector debt. 
Unfortunately, there is no available information on the final users of  the 
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that a high percentage of  the loans were used  in the service sector and in 
other nontradable sectors. The presumption is based on the fact that when 
depreciation of  the  peso  accelerated,  the  delinquency rates  in  the  banks 
increased considerably. In October 1982 it was reported that 40 percent of 
the banks’ portfolios were technically in default (World Bank 1985, 528). In 
fact,  the  debt  situation  is  at  least  partially  behind  the  measure  of 
“dedollarization,”  to be mentioned in chapter 6, which allowed the private 
sector to  repay  at  a  highly  favorable interest rate  the  dollar-denominated 
debts  incurred  by  the  domestic  banking  system.  Dedollarization  and 
exchange controls also erased the effective distinction between private and 
public debt after 1982, since the foreign debts of the private banks were to 
be repaid in pesos to the Central Bank, with the Central Bank then required 
to  honor  the  international obligations.  The  foreign  debt  of  the  domestic 
private banks  with  the  international banks  continues to  be  a thorny  issue 
because of  several legal and financial disputes between the banks and the 
government. 
No  information is  available  on  the  service burden  of  the  private  non- 
guaranteed debt. 
5.3  Short-Term Debt 
The  data  on  short-term  debt  are  particularly  poor.  With  the  scant 
information available,  we  can  obtain  only  a  rough  picture  of  what  has 
happened since 1978. In view of  the increasing difficulties of  the economy 
after  1978  and  the  hardening  of  terms  on  long-term  bank  lending,  the 
governments  have  increasingly  resorted  to  short-term  loans  from  other 
central  banks  in  the  region  and  from  commercial  banks.  Balance-of- 
payments problems (i.e.,  dwindling reserves as a result of  fixed exchange 
rates, domestic inflation, and large budget deficits) prompted the appeal for 
swap credits from foreign central banks,  while the state-owned Banco del 
Estado contracted commercial debts to channel them to the private sector. 
The worsening of  the situation in  1980 caused a delay in  payments of 
short-term commercial credits. This led to a refinancing agreement in April 
1981, to which we refer below, that converted about one-third of the public 
sector’s  short-term  loans  into  medium-term loans.  Unfortunately, the  re- 
financing did not substantially reduce the outstanding short-term debt, since 
the government made appeals to other sources for more short-term loans: 
Central  Bank  swaps  and  reciprocal  trade  credits  in  the  context  of  the 
economic integration scheme of  ALADI. In 1983 a large part of short-term 
loans owed to Argentina and Brazil were converted to medium-term credits. 
In  spite of  the conversions to MLT  debts,  the stock of  short-term debt 
continued increasing on account of arrearages. In 1980, short-term debt was 
11.1 percent of  the total external debt; in  1982,  it reached a low of  5.8 
percent; and in 1985, the percentage was 8.7 percent. Short-term debt was 
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5.4  The Hidden Costs of Easy Credit Availability 
Since the  early  1960s, the  prime  focus of  official  policy  had  been  to 
increase economic growth. The emphasis on this objective grew even more 
from  1973 to  1978, both  as  a product of  design and  as  a result of  very 
favorable external circumstances. The greater availability of  foreign credits 
coincided  with,  and  was  in  addition spurred by,  a  substantial increase in 
export  earnings.  Any  source  of  financing  for  capital  expansion  was 
welcomed at that point. The government had long tried to cater to foreign 
direct investors with generous fiscal incentives, but the response was weak 
outside of  the petroleum sector. Thus,  as  a  substitute,  it  started  to  court 
foreign lenders, who obliged as part of  the world credit expansion of  the 
1970s. Banzer’s government assured political and monetary stability, and the 
government offered, after some hesitation, exchange rate guarantees. This, 
and an ample supply of  development projects, however poor in  design or 
implementation,  sufficed  to  induce  a  very  significant  flow  of  external 
resources.  The  increase in  the  contribution of  foreign  loans  to  financing 
domestic  investment,  had,  however,  the  cost  of  further  impairing  the 
administration  of  the  public  sector.  The  easy  recourse  to  indebtedness 
weakened the budget constraints and indeed allowed the government more 
leniency in fiscal policies and on the exchange rate than there would have 
been otherwise. Moreover, the undemanding fiscal attitude was aggravated 
when access was gained to commercial bank credits that  were not  tied  to 
specific projects, in contrast to the case of official loans which almost always 
were based on specific projects. 
The access to loans on relatively easy terms also impeded the design of 
needed  reforms  in  the  financial  sector,  particularly  in  the  banks.  The 
intermediation of  foreign loans,  contracted by  the government or with  its 
guarantee, was a more important source of  profits to the private banks than 
the lending out of deposits made by domestic wealthholders. The neglect by 
the financial intermediaries of  the local demand for deposits in the banking 
system likely had  a negative longer-term effect on the mobilization of  do- 
mestic savings. 
The foreign loans were channelled to public investment projects and to the 
private sector through  “refinancing”  mechanisms. We  have noted at length 
in  the  previous  chapter  that  poor  project  design  and,  especially,  poor 
implementation,  led  in  many  cases  to  results  incommensurate  with  the 
resources that had been put out. A significant share of  the increase in public 
indebtedness was due to these factors.  Loans that  were  channelled to  the 
private sector did not fare better in regard to results, as they were diverted to 
speculative uses  and,  frequently, never  repaid.  In  many  notorious  cases, 
private lenders simply defaulted to the state banks that had channelled the 
external credits, and the government made no attempt to collect on the bad 
debts. This increased the demand for loans and, ironically, there was a ready 
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A  special mention  needs to be  made regarding exchange rate  policies. 
Overvaluation coupled with punitive taxation in the natural resources sector 
hampered investment in minerals, hence reducing the future supply of foreign 
exchange to honor the foreign debt obligations. In addition, overvaluation led 
to an expansion of  imports of  consumer durables that  was again financed 
directly and indirectly with foreign debt. Lastly, as the reserves of  foreign 
exchange became precariously low, partly because of  the currency overval- 
uation and the looming budget deficit, there was an increase in capital flight. 
Because of  the absence of  sound macroeconomic policies and the poor 
administration of  the  loans  intended  for  investment,  many  loans  simply 
became consumption loans in 1978-8 1. Their servicing would later require a 
drop in consumption, as indeed happened. In the transition, however, more 
indebtedness  was  accumulated  to  refinance  old  loans  and  their  interest 
charges. 
By  1980 Bolivia was already a highly indebted country, as indicated, for 
instance, by a debt-to-GDP ratio of 76 percent. It was then subjected to the 
sharp international interest rate  shock.  Arrears on  amortizations of  loans 
granted  by  private  creditors  started  to  build  up.  In  spite  of  a  debt 
rescheduling in 1981, the debt situation became aggravated. As seen in table 
5.5, from 1982 on, the net foreign resource transfers (net new lending minus 
interest  payments)  turned  negative  and  a  shift  from  external  sources of 
finance to internal sources occurred, throwing the country onto the path of 
hyperinflation. 
5.5  Debt Management, 1970-85 
In this section, some of  the more important institutional features of  the 
debt management are presented. One interesting feature is Article 56 of  the 
Table 5.5  Net Foreign Transfers on Medium- and Long-Term Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed Debt, 1970-87 
Net Resource Transfers  NUT  as Percentage 
















-  I35 














Source;  World Bank Debt Tables, 1988-89  edition. 
Note;  Net  resource  transfers  are  defined  as new  lending  minus  total  debt  servicing  (amortization  plus 
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Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  Bolivia,  which  requires  congressional 
approval of  all loans contracted by  the government of  Bolivia,  the public 
enterprises, and all public institutions, or on their behalf. Strictly speaking, 
the  loans contracted by  unconstitutional governments are  also unconstitu- 
tional. It should be recalled that during most of the period 1964-82,  Bolivia 
had only de facto  government^.^ 
Until 1974, government agencies and public enterprises negotiated foreign 
credits, which were furnished principally by  official lenders and by  suppliers 
of capital equipment. Central government agencies, municipalities, regional 
development  corporations,  and  committees  for  public  works  themselves 
engaged in the search for foreign credits. The grant element in the official 
foreign  loans  was  usually  so  important  that  the  higher  levels  of  the 
government,  cognizant of  this,  approved and  included them  in  the  fiscal 
budget.  In contrast,  suppliers’ credits were  systematically seen as  too ex- 
pensive and frowned upon, but the purchasers of goods with suppliers’ cred- 
its were usually in a position to overcome the objections of the Ministry of 
Finance and the Central Bank. In fact, the growth of suppliers’ credits led to 
increasing regulation in the mid-seventies. 
The haphazard way  in which the borrowing took place before 1974 was 
such that there are no good records on the state of  the public debt and, a 
fortiori, there was no policy on indebtedness, except the weak objections to 
suppliers’ credits,  mainly  under  the  advice  of  foreign  agencies of  inter- 
national cooperation. 
This  situation,  and  the  large expansion in  international credit  between 
1973 and 1978, led to two important regulatory measures. First, the National 
Institute  for  External  Financing  (INDEF)  was  created  in  1974  as  a 
decentralized government agency to keep track of  all indebtedness incurred 
in  the  public  sector through  its  financial and  nonfinancial  institutions,  to 
negotiate new loans, and in specific cases to refinance old loans. INDEF was 
to  be  especially  active  in  obtaining  general  balance-of-payments support 
loans. 
In 1974 a decree was passed establishing the National System of Projects. 
The objective was to create a set of  agencies, in a hierarchical structure, to 
help in the generation of  investment projects, to perform social cost-benefit 
analysis  of  them,  and  to  oversee  their  implementation.  The  search  for 
sources of financing of the projects was also included among the functions of 
the  system.  Large  investment  projects  and  their  financing  required  final 
approval by  the  National  Council  of  Economic  Planning  (CONEPLAN), 
composed of  several cabinet members and undersecretaries. Before projects 
arrived at CONEPLAN, they were to be screened by the National Committee 
of  Projects and its technical  secretariat^.^ 
Very  few investment projects followed the steps spelled out in the  1974 
decree.  The  process  of  approval  was  slow  and  cumbersome,  and  the 
technical secretariats lacked competent personnel. Managers of  government 223  BolividChapter 5 
agencies  frequently  ignored  the  guidelines  of  the  National  System  of 
Projects.  More  importantly,  vested  interests were  able  to  circumvent the 
procedures and get their projects to CONEPLAN directly. Several reforms of 
the National System of Projects were proposed between 1976 and 1986, but 
to no important effect. 
INDEF ceased to exist in  1979, and its functions were transferred to the 
Central Bank, where a division on external finance (FINEX) was  created. 
The  general objectives of  FINEX  were  very  similar to those of  INDEF. 
FINEX had the advantage of  being part of the Central Bank where it could 
enjoy better information support. Unfortunately, FINEX objectives were not 
met,  as  it  suffered  from  acute  political  interference.  The  Ministries  of 
Finance and  Planning frequently intervened  in FINEX  negotiations.  Very 
often,  debt  negotiating  committees  were  formed  by  making  appeals  to 
private  Bolivian  bankers  with  international  connections  and  neglecting 
FINEX (a case in point is the debt rescheduling of April  1981, discussed in 
sec. 5.6). 
The situation worsened during Siles Suazo’s administration, when almost 
everybody in the Cabinet felt obliged to intervene in debt negotiations. For 
instance, crucial debt reschedulings with Argentina and Brazil were carried 
out by  the Ministers of  Defense and Foreign Affairs.  A very  personalistic 
and ad hoc style of  debt negotiations developed, with a significant loss of 
institutional memory of  past negotiations, which was important since many 
agreements were verbal.  Bolivia,  as well  as its  partners,  suffered consid- 
erably from the rapid turnover in negotiators. 
The need to redress the confusion in the external debt accounts of Bolivia, 
as well as the need to have updated information on debt negotiations carried 
out by other countries in the same predicament, called for foreign expertise. 
Several debt  consulting  firms  and  personal  consultants were  hired.’  The 
consultants were, however, less helpful than expected, although it must be 
said in their behalf that they were contacted at a point when no solution was 
really in sight. 
If  the determination of  the correct size of the public external debt was a 
formidable task,  keeping track of  the foreign debt of  the Bolivian private 
sector  was  even  more  difficult.  It  is  worth  underscoring  that  a  good 
knowledge of  the size and structure of the private debt was essential for the 
design of policies aimed at the restoration of external equilibrium. Moreover, 
although  this  was  not  presumed  at  that  time,  most  of  the  private  debt 
eventually  became  “nationalized”  with  the  dedollarization  measure  of 
November 1982. 
In  1979, ceilings on the stock of short-term debts, both private and public, 
were  set. The obligation to  register the debts of  the private sector in the 
Central Bank was also established, but unfortunately this obligation was not 
tightly fulfilled. The lack of adequate information on the debt of  the private 
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5.6  Debt Reschedulings, 1980-85 
The  debt  crisis  of  the  1980s commenced  with  a  small  crisis  in  1980, 
during the government of Luis Garcia Meza. Arrears in amortizations to the 
commercial banks eventually led to a restructuring of the debt in April 1981, 
which was crucial for triggering further developments. The eventful years of 
1980-81  had  also led to an  abnormal growth  of  short-term credit to the 
generals  in  Bolivia from the  generals in  Brazil  and  especially Argentina. 
Arrears  on  those  debts  were  also  refinanced  in  1983  with  important 
implications. 
The chronology of events that led to the April  1981 agreement has been 
described by Baptista (1985) and Rivas (1986). Bolivia had ceased to make 
amortization payments after the Garcia Meza coup in July  1980. Because of 
this, the creditor banks gathered in Caracas in August, formed a consortium, 
and elected the Bank of America as the leader of a Coordinating Committee 
formed by the Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Deutsche Sudamerikanische 
Bank, American Express, Crocker National Bank, Libra Bank, Manufactur- 
ers Hanover Trust, Texas Commerce Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Irving 
Trust. The Coordinating Committee represented  128 creditor banks.  In the 
same Caracas meeting, an agreement was reached to reschedule debts with 
repayments  due between  28 August  1980 and 5 January  1981. In  January 
198  1, the government  of  Bolivia was to meet again with the Coordinating 
Committee.  No  agreement  was  reached  in January except on the  need  to 
meet again  in  April  1981. Notwithstanding,  Bolivia  made  some bona  fide 
payments. 
After all these postponements, the April  1981 meeting took place in New 
York. Debts to the consortium amounted to U.S.$722 million (or 19 percent 
of  GDP),  of  which  U.S.$457.3  million  were  to  be  rescheduled  in  four 
tranches.  The  April  agreement  consisted  essentially  of  a  conversion  of 
short-term loans in arrears to a medium-term loan and a reprogramming of 
medium-term  loam6  The rescheduling  called for a  10 percent  down pay- 
ment of the refinanced loans according to the original schedule of maturities. 
The April 29th refinancing has been very much criticized within Bolivia. 
The thrust of the argument is that Bolivia was overcharged,  with its costs 
and conditions well above what other countries obtained at that moment or 
shortly after. A more telling point  is that  it was extremely unrealistic  that 
Bolivia would be able to come close to achieving the terms of the agreement. 
It should also be noted that the agreement called for Bolivia to sign an IMF 
program which never occurred. The Coordinating Committee routinely asked 
for the fulfillment of this clause and, as routinely, waived it. 
Bolivia was unable to meet the terms of the April  1981 agreement and fell 
in arrears by September 1982. Several meetings took place to normalize the 
situation,  but  to no avail.  A  semblance of  normality  prevailed,  however, 
during the term of Minister of Finance Flavio Machicado in 1983, when debt 225  BolividChapter 6 
servicing  was  resumed.  Bolivia  finally  declared  a  moratorium  to  the 
commercial banks in mid-1984. 
Bolivia  was  able  to  get  some  debt  alleviation  more  easily  with  two 
bilateral creditors: Brazil  and  Argentina.  A  total  of  U.S.$716  million of 
short-term debt  and  principal on  medium-term  debt  was  refinanced  with 
those countries in  1983 on relatively easy terms: a fixed interest rate of  8 
percent, maturities between 8 and  10 years,  and grace periods of  3 years. 
This scheme of refinancing was found acceptable by  the Bolivian public and 
did  not  provoke  the  kind  of  criticism  that  the  rescheduling  with  the 
commercial banks  had  received.  The  international organizations,  on  the 
contrary,  objected  to  the  status  of  “preferred  creditor”  that  Argentina 
received because it was  able to use the natural gas exports of  Bolivia  as 
collateral. 
5.7  Developments After 1985 
In chapter 8 we provide a detailed analysis of Bolivia’s debt renegotiations 
after 1985. The main point that can be mentioned here is that the government 
under President Paz  took a very different approach to negotiations. Having 
inherited a unilateral suspension of payments on the bank debt from the Siles 
government,  the  Paz  administration maintained the  suspension and began 
negotiations with the banks addressed to a long-term solution to the crisis 
instead of  another rescheduling. Some results were achieved in 1988 when 
Bolivia  was  able to retire approximately one-half  of  its commercial bank 
debt at a price of  11 cents per dollar. In 1989, more debt was retired and 
negotiations  continued  on  the  remaining  debt  that  had  not  yet  been 
repurchased. 
6 
The  inflation  in 
The Emergence of 
Hyperinflation, 1982-85 
Bolivia  in  1984 and  1985 was  the  most  rapid  in  Latin 
American history up  to that date and one of  the highest in world history.’ 
During the first half of  1985, the inflation surged to an annual rate of  about 
26,000 percent  (approximately 60 percent per  month),  and  it  reached  an 
annual rate of  60,000 percent during May-August  1985. As shown in table 
6.1, the inflation was brought under control in the second half of  1985, and 
then after a sharp jump in prices in January 1986, inflation was kept at low 